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Abstract 
 
Can metaphysics ever really be compatible with science? In this paper, I investigate the implications of the 
methodological approach to metaphysical theorizing known as naturalized metaphysics. In the past, 
metaphysics has been rejected entirely by empirically-minded philosophers as being too open to 
speculation and for relying on methods which are not conducive to truth. But naturalized metaphysics aims 
to be a less radical solution to these difficulties, treating metaphysical theorizing as being continuous with 
science and restricting metaphysical methods to empirically respectable ones. I investigate a significant 
difficulty for naturalized metaphysics: that it lacks the methodological resources to comparatively evaluate 
competing ontological theories, or even to distinguish adequately between them. This objection is more 
acute when applied to robust realist versions of naturalized metaphysics, since the realist should be able to 
say which theory is true of the objective world. If this objection holds, then it seems that the commitment to 
naturalized metaphysics, or to robust realism about the categories and processes in metaphysics, will have 
to be relaxed. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the prospects for a recently popular conception of 
metaphysical theorizing known as naturalized metaphysics. In particular, I aim to 
highlight the incompatibility of naturalized metaphysics with realism about the entities of 
metaphysical theories, an incompatibility which arises because naturalized metaphysics 
lacks the methodological resources to choose which metaphysical theory is the one that 
picks out the entities of the actual world. I will then briefly investigate some of the 
implications of this conclusion, focusing upon the question of whether one could simply 
accept the ontological plurality which naturalized metaphysics permits and yet retain 
some realist commitment. This is a view I will call ‘metaphysical structuralism’ and I will 
briefly consider two ways in which it might be understood.  
 
In the first section, I will discuss what exactly I take naturalized metaphysics to be. In the 
second, I will present the outline of an argument that the conjunction of robust realism  
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and naturalized metaphysics entails a plurality of ontological positions between which 
there is no basis for the naturalist metaphysician to make a principled choice. In the third 
and fourth sections, I will defend two of the more contentious premises of that argument: 
in Section 3, establishing that there are cases of ontological plurality; and, in Section 4, 
that there is no way in which to choose between these ontological alternatives using a 
method which is acceptable within naturalized metaphysics. In the final section I will 
consider the conclusions which one might draw from the incompatibility of robust 
realism and naturalized metaphysics, and whether a reconciliation is possible.  
 
 
1. What is Naturalized Metaphysics? 
 
Put simply, metaphysics is the study of which entities and processes exist, and what their 
ontological status is; that is, whether they are real or not.1 In this paper, I will restrict 
myself to considering the metaphysics of the natural world2, the study of ontology which 
one would hope could help to explain (or explain away) phenomena such as causation, 
regularity, qualitative similarity and difference, and so on.  
 
One can distinguish between two conceptions of the nature of metaphysics and 
metaphysical theorizing: naturalized metaphysics; and autonomous, or ‘a priori’, 
metaphysics.3 While the latter regards metaphysical theorizing as being independent from 
empirical investigation, the former considers metaphysics to be continuous with, or a 
branch of science. This continuity of metaphysics with empirical investigation results in 
the second defining characteristic of naturalized metaphysics: that metaphysics shares its 
methodology with science (whatever the methodology of science may be). Naturalized 
metaphysical theories are only open to revision on logical grounds or upon those which 
are naturalistically or empirically acceptable. Thirdly, methods of justification which do 
not meet these standards are excluded from use as methodological tools in metaphysical 
theorizing. So, for example, there can be no appeal to substantive, non-logical a priori 
claims, nor appeals to common-sense intuition, if these cannot be accounted for 
naturalistically.  
 
Of course, it would be philosophically contentious to say that a particular method of 
justification cannot be accounted for naturalistically, and I will have more to say about 
such issues later on. So, for this reason, I am leaving the characterization of naturalized 
metaphysics deliberately vague; the range of justification which is acceptable to 
empirical investigation—and thus to the naturalist metaphysician—cannot be delineated a 
priori into a specific, unrevisable list.  
 
For similar reasons, I will not adopt another popular tactic of defining naturalized 
metaphysics as metaphysics that simply restricts the use of a priori reasoning, or aims to 
avoid it altogether. Although some such constraint is often placed upon theorizing in 
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naturalized metaphysics, and the avoidance of a priori ontological speculation is one of 
the primary motivations for its being proposed, the avoidance of a priori reasoning makes 
for a poor defining characteristic for two reasons. First, as I mentioned above, it is not 
clear which types of a priori reasoning are naturalistically unacceptable in the sense that a 
naturalistic account of them cannot be given; second, it is not clear that the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction coincides with the empirical/non-empirical one (see Goldman 2007; 
Ahlstrom 2009, 19). Natural science is prone to the extensive employment of reasoning 
which is not empirically acceptable by the standards I am setting, usually on the proviso 
that it eventually yields empirically testable hypotheses, and whether such reasoning is to 
be considered to be a priori, or as a posteriori and non-empirical, is at least partially a 
terminological debate in which there is no need to become entangled at this stage. The 
simple restriction of permissible a priori metaphysical reasoning to logical or 
mathematical reasoning is too crude to ensure the continuity of metaphysics with science, 
and most probably too conceptually impoverished to produce useful metaphysical 
results.4 Thus, the commonly drawn contrast between ‘naturalized’ and ‘a priori’ 
metaphysics is somewhat misleading from a terminological point of view, and I will leave 
scare quotes around ‘a priori’ in this context.  
 
The three defining features distinguishing naturalized metaphysics which I have 
discussed concern the permissible methodology of metaphysics, and consequently affect 
the epistemic status of metaphysical claims, which they are intended to bring into line 
with those of science. Furthermore, they restrict the permissible content of metaphysical 
theories by restricting the methods by which they might be justified. Thus, although the 
distinction between ‘a priori’ and naturalized metaphysics begins as a methodological, or 
meta-philosophical one, it has consequences for the epistemic status of metaphysics, and 
the content and scope of metaphysical enquiry.  
 
In addition to the above considerations, some naturalistic metaphysicians also add a 
fourth constraint upon the permissible content of metaphysical theorizing, requiring that 
it be driven by, inspired by, or motivated by, or close to empirical science (for example, 
Ladyman and Ross 2007).5 However, I will not treat this as a defining feature of 
naturalized metaphysics in this paper, although some of its proponents would take it to be 
so, rather I will treat it an important means by which a metaphysical theory might be 
developed. One reason for this, is that it is not really clear what is meant by the idea of 
metaphysical content being ‘driven’ or ‘motivated by’ that of science, or in what sense 
metaphysical theorizing must be ‘close to’ that of science, with the consequence that 
those who support this defining purpose of metaphysical theorizing can appear rather 
equivocal about what they take the relationship between empirical and metaphysical 
content to be. However, this equivocation need not delay the current investigation since 
the adoption of such constraint is independent of the acceptance of the other defining 
features of naturalized metaphysics detailed above; the requisite clarification need not be 
conducted in order to characterize naturalized metaphysics and to permit the discussion to 
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commence. Nevertheless, in Section 4, I will very briefly consider whether restricting the 
remit of metaphysics in this way can remedy the predicament of ontological plurality that 
I will argue that naturalized metaphysics faces. 
 
 
2. The Conflict between Realism and Naturalized Metaphysics 
 
One can summarize the main argument in this paper as arising from the conflict between 
the following premises: 
 
More than one ontological theory fulfils the same explanatory aims. 
 
If robust realism is true, then one of these theories is the correct, or true 
one. 
 
If one takes a naturalistic approach to metaphysics, then there is no 
method of choosing between theories which: (a) is naturalistically 
acceptable; (b) does not presuppose the existence of some of the very 
ontology postulated by the theory. 
 
If there is no basis for choice, then any decision between theories would 
be arbitrary, which is not acceptable from the point of view of realism 
(nor, perhaps, in general). 
 
Broadly speaking, three alternative conclusions can be drawn from this contradictory set: 
 
Conclusion 1: Robust realism is false: realism should be relaxed or 
abandoned in favour of another way of regarding the relationship between 
our theories and the world. 
 
Conclusion 2: Naturalized metaphysics cannot be sustained in its current 
form. 
 
Conclusion 3: One of the above premises is false. 
 
In order to establish that the third conclusion is the least likely and leave the way open for 
one, or both, of the other two—that robust realism is false, or that naturalized 
metaphysics should be abandoned—I will now investigate the basis for holding the above 
statements true. I will begin by attempting to establish the first statement: that there are 
many ontological theories which fulfil the same explanatory aims, and between which 
there is no obvious grounds for choice specific to the theories themselves. This premise is 
not particularly contentious, but it may not be an obvious claim to all, so I will elaborate 
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further in the next section. Premise (2) is true by definition, since the robust form of 
realism with which I am concerned makes the ontological claim that there is a way the 
natural world is. In most cases, an epistemological claim is added to the ontological one, 
stating that we can know (by means of our best scientific theories) the way the world is. 
(It is not incoherent to suppose that there is a particular way the world is, and yet that we 
do not have epistemic access to this natural order. However, within the confines of 
naturalized metaphysics, this attitude would be quite odd, since it would open an 
epistemic gulf between the entities and processes in empirical theories and the postulated 
entities and processes of the real natural world.) Thus, the robust realism with which I am 
concerned represents the conjunction of metaphysical realism (or alternative realist 
ontological theories) with scientific realism, a conjunction which is quite commonly held 
in metaphysics and the philosophy of science.6 Premise (3) is the hardest to establish, and 
impossible to do so completely, but I will attempt to establish its likelihood in Section 4 
by discussing ways in which metaphysical theories might be justified and compared, and 
then assessing whether these methods are acceptable from a naturalistic perspective.  
 
If the premises of the above argument are correct, as I will argue that they are in the next 
two sections, then I will have established that ontological plurality is an inevitable 
consequence of naturalized metaphysics, a feature which brings it into conflict with 
robust realism about the entities which our ontological theories say that the natural world 
contains. From there, a variety of responses follow which I have broadly classified as 
Conclusions 1 and 2, and I will then examine these in greater detail.   
 
 
3. Ontological Plurality 
 
A brief examination of the literature in metaphysics will reveal that many theories are 
proffered with the promise of their explaining the same questions about fundamental 
phenomena. But, actual variety does not imply that each ontological variant is worthy of 
serious philosophical consideration, nor that it will turn out that there is nothing to choose 
between the options, so I will argue for Premise (1) by illustrating how certain key 
questions in metaphysics can be dealt with by different ontological accounts. By this 
strategy, I hope to show that there are several prima facie different ways in which to 
achieve the same explanatory aims when it comes to providing an account of the 
fundamental ontology of the natural world and thus establish the plausibility of Premise 
(1).  
 
The first metaphysical question I will consider concerns how we should account for 
objective similarity and difference in nature. We are prone to noticing, judging or simply 
accepting that spatio-temporally distinct entities are Indian elephants, or are sky blue, or 
are spiral galaxies, or are electrons, or have a mass of one kilogram; that is, that spatio-
temporally distinct entities are qualitatively the same as each other. Presuming, as I will 
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in this discussion, that such similarities and differences are real, and that the distinctions 
between them have an ontological basis in the natural world, rather than their being 
partially or entirely ontologically grounded in predicates or in other features of our 
language or theory, then what is the ontological basis in question?7  
 
One can argue that properties, tropes, resemblance classes, universals and nominalist sets 
of objects, or sets of possibilia all successfully fulfil the function of grounding the notion 
of objective similarity and difference of spatio-temporally distinct individuals. (For a 
range of  alternatives, see Achinstein 1974; Armstrong 1978; Armstrong 1980; Armstrong 
1992; Bacon 1995; Campbell 1981; Campbell 1990; Lewis 1983; Lewis 1986; Mellor 
1993; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002; Schaffer 2001; Shoemaker 1980; Simons 1994; Williams 
1953; Williams 1959.8) These alternative theories initially appear to be quite different 
from each other, both in their respective motivations and the ontology they postulate as a 
result. For instance, one of the main motivations for the development of trope theory, 
which distinguishes it from other accounts of similarity and difference, is that trope 
theory regards qualities as unrepeatable abstract particulars, rather than instances of 
repeatable entities; the individuality of qualities, particularized in each of their 
occurrences, is emphasised. However, this individuality comes at a price, as David 
Armstrong made much of in his early work (Armstrong 1978), since the individual tropes 
do not, by definition, have any ontological features which could account for their varying 
similarity or difference from each other. But without these relations, tropes are both in 
danger of simply being an ontology of bare particulars, and of failing their explanatory 
purpose to ground objective similarity and difference. The individual qualities 
instantiated by the sky on a cloudless summer’s day, the light emitted by a particular 
indium gallium nitride LED, Elvis Presley’s suede shoes, and a particular Yves Klein 
painting (IKB 191, say)—all of which are blue—are no more similar to each other than 
they are to instances of a traditional London bus, a litre of H2O, or a photon; nor, given 
that tropes are particularized qualities, do they possess any ontological resource in virtue 
of which such resemblances might hold. In view of this, contemporary trope theorists 
have stipulated their way around the problem by postulating some kind of primitive meta-
relations between tropes which relate the individuals by qualitative resemblance, 
compresence (so that tropes ‘bundle’ into unified objects) and temporal sequence. These 
rid trope theory of the accusations about bare particulars, and provide the trope theory 
with sufficient ontological resources to do the job for which tropes were intended; 
namely, to provide an ontological account of the natural world. But these revisions come 
at the price of reducing trope theory’s attraction as an ontology of true individuals: tropes 
are individual qualities, but they are fundamentally related to each other too. Meanwhile, 
the theory of universals appears to offer something ontologically different, at least at first 
blush: different instances of blue such as those in the example above, are instances of one 
repeatable entity, a universal, which on some accounts is an abstract entity, and on others 
an immanent one in the sense that it is nothing more than the totality of its instances.9 A 
third alternative is offered by property theories, which may like David Lewis’s famous 
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nominalism be grounded in a set-theoretic structure with set membership eligible to 
actual and possible entities, with a hierarchy which is ultimately grounded on a sparse 
ontology of perfectly natural properties; or which may simply presume that properties are 
fundamentally-existing attributes instantiated by objects, entities for which no further 
ontological explanation is required.  
 
In addition to these ontological alternatives, there is an orthogonal debate about the extent 
to which properties possess or consist in intrinsic qualitative features (instantiated by 
objects, or compresent bundles of tropes, most usually10), or if their natures are entirely 
determined by the causal or structural relations in which they partake. On the one hand, 
intrinsic qualities, quiddities or categorical properties possess a qualitative nature over 
and above what they can cause or otherwise determine, for example by supervenience. 
On the other, properties are what they can do and nothing more: they are entirely 
determined by their extrinsic relations. Between these extremes lie a number of views, 
such as that which treats properties as intrinsic and yet inherently dispositional (see 
Chakravartty 2003, among others), or those which regard some properties as being 
categorical, possessing a quiddity or internal nature, and some as being extrinsically 
determined. 
 
Despite the differences in theoretical formulation between these options—and some 
theories requiring more ontological baggage than others, such as the modal realist 
presupposition of the existence of possible worlds in the same sense as the actual one—
the understanding of qualities such as redness, or charge, or mass is not enhanced by the 
adoption of one theory over another. The reason for this explanatory equivalence is that 
such alternative ontological theories are forced into equilibrium by the requirement that 
they provide solutions to the same explanatory demands, which restricts any interesting 
individuality of a particular theory to the initial stages of its formulation. Thus, as noted 
above, early versions of trope theory gave way to less particularized qualities, while some 
universals theorists shunned the abstract existence of universals in favour of an ontology 
of immanent entities, wholly present in each of their instances. On stepping aside from 
the details of the ontological debate, it appears that one ontological theory could be 
swapped for another with only minor, mainly terminological, changes to the wider 
philosophical debates in which such entities appear. Similarly, it is not obvious how the 
outcome of the debate about quiddities would influence one’s philosophical debates, 
especially from a naturalized metaphysics, since quiddities do not do anything observable 
(even in principle) which properties lacking quiddities do not. 
 
Although the proponents of these alternatives (naturally) urge us to accept one account 
rather than another, their differences in formulation do not show up beyond metaphysical 
discussions: it matters not that one is discussing universals rather than tropes (say) in the 
philosophy of mind or science, since both ontologies do their explanatory job without 
interesting consequences for the theories that use them. (This fact is so by design, as I 
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mentioned above, since individual theoretical quirks are regarded as undesirable in 
fundamental ontological theories and much thought goes into stamping them out.) Of 
course, traditional, ‘a priori’ metaphysicians do find grounds upon which to decide 
between theories, and so reduce the choice,11 so I will have more to say about how one 
might distinguish between these different views in Section 4, and a lot more to say about 
whether such means are open to the supporters of naturalized metaphysics. But, at this 
point in the discussion, it is enough to note that the various theories of properties, tropes, 
universals and the rest do the explanatory job of explaining similarity and difference, and 
perhaps also the causal behaviour of entities, with closely comparable success, to the 
extent that it is not obvious which theory is the best one to choose. 
 
A comparable embarrassment of explanatory riches awaits in the second example that I 
will use, which concerns questions about causation and the appearance of regularities; 
that is, how and why some things or events (or types of things or events) give rise to 
other things or events (or types of things or events). More formally, such theories are 
intended to explicate the relationship between qualitative similarity of entities and 
causality (or other dependency relations), or, as such accounts might more commonly be 
described, between properties and causal laws. From one perspective, one can choose to 
use a theory of properties, universals or tropes—whichever metaphysical account is 
favoured for such entities—as a foundation for what happens causally in the natural 
world. What kinds of entities there are, what properties are instantiated, determines what 
will happen, perhaps given the instantiation of other properties. Moreover, such a system 
also provides an in-built modal element: the properties instantiated do not simply 
determine what does and will happen, but what would occur were the world different in 
certain ways (where this difference is usually determined by the presence or absence of 
other properties within it). Causal relations are entirely determined by which properties 
there are and, furthermore, the generality inherent in the conception of a property ensures 
that such causal relations are essentially lawlike12; singular causal instances are instances 
of causal laws or nomological relations which govern what happens causally in the 
natural world. 
 
In addition to causation, some theories would also allow for other, atemporal dependency 
relations such as supervenience or realisation. However, since these dependency relations 
can be dealt with as atemporal analogues of causation, I will restrict myself to talking 
about causation or nomological relations in this discussion. The latter terminology of 
nomological relations is more general, and is intended to cover supervenience and the 
like, and also to satisfy those who would prefer that talk of causation be dropped in 
favour of nomological relations or laws. The question of whether there is such a 
phenomenon of causation, over and above the process which instantiates nomological 
connections between properties, is a vexed one and will not be solved here. However, if 
there is such a distinct process over and above the general nomological relations 
causation instantiates, it could either be thought of as a general, temporally asymmetric 
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determination relation, or, be treated analogously to the quiddities which some 
metaphysicians ascribe to properties, as the essential and individual qualitative, 
determining factor in each individual causal instance. The former conception would suit 
those who regard causation as something more than simple nomologicality, while the 
latter might suit those who do not regard causation as an essentially general relation, but 
as a category of processes consisting of a collection of singular instances (see Anscombe 
1971; Ducasse 1926; Davidson 1967).  Moreover, despite initial appearances to the 
contrary, even this latter particularized conception of causation might be accounted for 
entirely in terms of the instantiation of properties, since the singularity of every causal 
instance could be determined by the kind of properties possessing quiddities: the 
individuality of the properties could underpin the individuality of the causal instances, 
while the repeatable aspect of the properties would underpin the causal laws. Once again, 
one can provide an ontology of what happens in the world solely in terms of properties of 
one species or another.13 
 
On the other hand, one might prefer to reverse the direction of ontological dependence 
from the above family of ontological theories, in which causal and other nomological 
relations are determined by kinds of entities (the properties, or whatever you prefer), and 
characterize kinds as being ontologically dependent upon which relations there are. This, 
perhaps less popular, view is exemplified by some versions of ontic structural realism 
which regard the modal or nomological structure of the world as being ontologically 
fundamental, determining the appearance, or the derivative existence, of both properties 
and things (see, for example, James Ladyman 1998; Ladyman and Ross 2007).14 Which 
things there are, and which properties they instantiate, is entirely determined by the 
nomological relations in which such entities or, apparent entities, stand. The eliminativist 
versions of this view, which reject the existence of objects and properties entirely, are 
difficult to articulate without seemingly begging the question: relations require the 
existence of relata and yet the objectively existing nomological structure of Ladyman’s 
ontic structural realism lacks relata (see Psillos 2001; Chakravartty 1998). However, it is 
unclear whether this difficulty marks a genuine ontological restriction or merely one that 
is a result of the conceptual limitations of most (or all) human languages. I will not 
attempt to resolve this objection definitively, although I think that the eliminativists might 
be able to justify their claim that the coherence of their ontology requires a radical change 
of perspective and so that accusations of their begging the question are unfounded and 
unfair. Even if the eliminativists eventually lose this argument, conceptual space remains 
for a relations-based characterization of the ontology of the natural world that treats 
properties and objects as derivative entities, and this ontology could provide an 
ontological background theory which is explanatorily equivalent to the accounts of 
causation and laws based on properties outlined above.   
 
In addition to these two ontologically opposed alternatives to account for causation and 
laws, there is a third that incorporates the fundamental ontology of both, in which 
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properties enter into nomological relations with each other. Once again, a range of 
alternative conceptions of properties and nomological relations can be sustained within 
this general ontological picture: members of either or both of the fundamental ontological 
categories could involve quiddity, or some primitive individual nature, without this 
feature impinging upon, or adding to, the explanatory efficacy of the specific ontological 
account in comparison to others. Although one might argue that this third option is not as 
parsimonious as the two alternatives already given, it is not yet clear whether parsimony 
is required, or even advisable, in this context, nor whether it will help a realist decide 
which ontological theory best accounts for the natural world. I will postpone discussion 
of parsimony and other theoretical virtues until later when I consider the scope of their 
applicability, and implications in naturalized metaphysics.  
 
Thus, in the case of properties and nomological relations, we have another example of 
seemingly dissimilar ontological theories fulfilling the same explanatory aims: if one 
subscribes to robust realism, a means of making an ontological choice between these 
theories is required. 
 
The third example of ontological plurality which I will present in support of Premise 1 
arises as part of an answer to the question of what things, or objects, are, and concerns 
those ontological theories which include objects as fundamental and those which do not. 
On one hand, one can treat things or objects as individuals, as self-subsistent entities 
which can exist independently of any other category of entities; or, on the other, one can 
maintain that what we commonly take to be individuals are bundles of property-
instances, or tropes, or other instances of repeatable entities. (Once again, for this task 
one can use any of the conceptions of properties and the like discussed in the first 
example of ontological plurality above, except those which require the existence of 
objects to explicate objective similarity and difference.) Although the differences between 
these two ontological views are contested in metaphysical circles, they are as good as 
each other at explaining our intuitions, our experiences (both common-sense and 
empirical) and providing an ontological backdrop for philosophical discussions 
concerning persistence and change. In addition to these two, a third option for the 
characterization of objects suggests itself in which objects are treated as derivative 
entities within a fundamentally structural ontology, such as that of non-eliminativist ontic 
structural realism. On this view, properties can be treated as derivative too, their natures 
determined by the fundamental nomological relations or structure, and in turn objects 
exist derivatively as bundles of property-instances. Objects are not self-subsistent 
individuals on this account, but are derived from entities which are themselves derived 
from the fundamental relational ontology of the world.  
 
On the first of these views of objects, self-subsistent individuals may be thought to 
involve some primitive unity or haecceity which prima facie cannot be accounted for by 
the ontologies which treat objects as derivative entities. But, these latter accounts might 
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be able provide analogous features which could underpin the appearance of such object-
individuality. If such a phenomenon of individual quirkiness turns out to be required by 
an ontological theory of objects, it might be possible to provide the requisite extra 
‘something’ by other ontological means; namely, by properties or their instances having 
quiddities (in the second option above), or by relations or their instances involving an 
analogous feature which guarantees their essential nature, and bestows apparent quiddity 
or haecceity on entities of categories which are ontologically derived from them. Thus, 
the appearance of individuality accorded to an object (if any) could be explicated by the 
individual qualitative natures of the entities making up the bundle of which it is 
constituted.15 
 
On the basis of these three examples, it seems that metaphysicians have a prima facie 
choice about which ontological theories they adopt concerning the nature of qualitative 
similarity and difference, the relationship between properties and causation or laws, and 
what, ontologically speaking, objects are. While there is more to say about the 
formulation, and near explanatory equivalence, of these theoretical alternatives outside 
metaphysics, their further examination strays outside the scope of this paper. So I will 
now look at how one might go about choosing between these different ontological 
options, and whether the grounds for making such choices are available to the supporter 
of naturalized metaphysics.   
 
 
4. Ontological Choice, and Ontological Choice for Naturalized Metaphysics 
 
How does one choose between competing metaphysical theories? And, how does one 
make such a choice on naturalistic grounds? Within traditional, autonomous metaphysics 
there are several ways in which competing alternative theories may be distinguished and 
evaluated, and although these do not facilitate an uncontroversial decision between them, 
they do permit individual philosophers to claim to have made a principled choice. 
However, in the course of this section, I will argue that the methods which are acceptable 
within naturalized metaphysics are not sufficient to make a choice, and the methods 
which do allow one to make a choice between ontological theories are not acceptable 
within the methodology of naturalized metaphysics. Thus, the naturalized metaphysician 
lacks the resources with which to determine (or even approximate) which ontological 
theory is the correct one, and thereby fails to fulfil the requirement of robust realism that 
we can know about the objectively-existing ontology of the mind-independent16 natural 
world. 
 
The criteria upon which one can choose between competing metaphysical theories can be 
summarized by the following list which I will then consider in turn: 
 
a) Logical Considerations; 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:1                                                                                                         Allen | 222 
 
 
 
 
b) Theoretical Virtues; 
 
c) Intuition; 
 
d) A Posteriori Considerations (or, the Appeal to Science). 
 
The first, logical criterion is unproblematically acceptable within naturalized 
metaphysics, since the application of logic is uncontroversial within science too: purely 
formal considerations do not, for the most part, rely upon any presuppositions about 
meaning, and thus potentially about the nature of the world. Although logical theorems 
have occasionally been brought into question within scientific investigation, such as with 
the controversy surrounding the truth of the law of the excluded middle (Reichenbach 
1944) or the principle of distributivity in quantum theory (Putnam 1968, although Putnam 
no longer subscribes to this view), any divergence from classical logic is not usually 
taken to indicate that classical logic is not applicable to the formulation of our 
metaphysical theories. One could, I suppose, make a principled case for a shift from 
classical logic to an alternative in this context. However, this would not damage the 
utility of logic as a criterion in naturalized metaphysics: the acceptability of such a 
criterion within naturalized metaphysics is not based upon the fact that logic is true or 
unrevisable, but because it is formal and also acceptable within empirical investigation.17 
 
However, logical considerations alone are insufficient to determine which metaphysical 
theory is the right one. Moreover, in general, such constraints have already been brought 
to bear in order to determine the range of competing ontological candidates in the first 
place. Internal consistency, for example, is a necessary condition for a theory being a 
viable candidate to describe the ontology of the world, but it is not sufficient. The array 
of alternative ontological theories given in Section 3 are all (most probably) internally 
consistent, since inconsistent theories would have been ruled out as candidates at an 
earlier stage. Thus, logic does very little to help decide between them. 
 
One might also include mathematical considerations with the logical ones, since these are 
also empirically uncontroversial despite the fact that empiricist philosophers disagree 
about the correct metaphysical account of the nature of mathematics.18 However, 
although some set theoretic considerations might find their way into metaphysical 
discussions, there is not much call for mathematics in ontological investigations even 
though its use would be countenanced. I will take it therefore that, like logic, the 
accordance with mathematical principles is a necessary condition of the adequacy of an 
ontological theory, but not sufficient to provide a criterion to choose between rival 
candidates.  
 
The second source of potential justification of one ontological theory over another comes 
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from the set of theoretical desiderata, known as ‘theoretical virtues’ although they may 
not deserve the name. These include simplicity, parsimony, elegance, economy, 
explanatory power, theoretical unity and so on, and these are often be cited by the 
champions of one or other of the competing ontological theories in Section 3 as deciding 
factors in the acceptance of their favoured theory at the expense of the others. For 
instance, one might use simplicity or parsimony to urge the rejection of trope theory, 
since trope theory requires the presupposition of primitive meta-relations between tropes, 
thereby adding to and complicating the fundamental trope ontology merely to ensure that 
it fulfils its explanatory purpose of providing an account of qualitative similarity and 
difference, apparent objecthood and temporal or causal order. Or, a partial resolution 
might be offered in the second example of ontological plurality, concerning the 
relationship between properties and nomological relations, by rejecting the least 
parsimonious ontological option that postulates both ontological categories as 
fundamental. (I cite these as examples, without the intention of endorsing such claims.) 
Such virtues find similar use in the development of scientific theories, where one may 
prefer a theory which unifies disparate areas of science over one which does not, or the 
theory which postulates fewer entities over the theory populated by a range of as-yet-
undetected kinds. The application of these virtues may also intersect, in both science and 
metaphysics, with the application of the aforementioned logical and mathematical 
constraints: a theory may be rejected (or side-lined) in favour of alternatives if it presents 
an obstacle to future unification with other, well-confirmed theories, even though it may 
be in no way obvious how this unification might be implemented. For example, certain 
interpretations of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics, and GRW collapse 
theories, are regarded as less viable than their rivals as candidates for explaining the 
quantum realm because in their respective current forms, they conflict with General 
Relativity.19 
 
However, despite the widespread use of theoretical virtues, and the explanatory success 
which has resulted from their application in science, there are two key problems with 
their being utilized in order to decide which ontological account of the natural world is 
correct. The first issue concerns their status: are the more simple theories (say) more 
desirable because the world is simple, or is simplicity just a pragmatically useful tool in 
the development of theories (both metaphysical and empirical)? If the latter is the case, 
then adherence to such virtues is neither necessary, nor even desirable to resolve the 
question of which theory is objectively true: theoretical virtues do not help to establish 
realism about the entities in a theory. On the other hand, it is notoriously difficult to 
justify the former claim that the world is simple (say) without begging the question in 
favour of the type of realism which requires objective simplicity to establish its own 
truth. Furthermore, even if one were in a position to make a well-founded claim that the 
objective world is simple, it is not clear how this notion of objective simplicity measures 
up to our conception of simplicity, and thus whether the theories that we consider to be 
the more simple ones would be more simple ones objectively speaking. For a traditional 
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‘a priori’ metaphysician, it might be possible to solve this problem by stipulation and 
simply presuppose that such features in our theories match those of the objective world 
somehow;20 but for the follower of naturalized metaphysics, such a priori stipulation is 
not an option. Whatever our guiding principles in theoretical development, the world may 
turn out to be complex, or the theories that we consider to be simple may not be simple in 
objective terms: the naturalized metaphysician is cannot stipulate his way out of the 
problem and simply rule these possibilities out.21   
 
The second problem facing the use of theoretical virtues to choose between competing 
theories concerns the difficulty of weighing up incommensurate virtues: is a simple 
theory which is less parsimonious better than a theory which postulates more entities and 
has fewer equations (say)? Even those theorists who recommend the ramseyfication of 
theories—that is, the conversion of theoretical sentences into Ramsey sentences (Lewis 
1970)—are faced with this problem since two orthogonal aspects of simplicity and 
parsimony are still associated with theories in such a form. Such interplay between 
virtues complicates the issues raised in the first objection to their use to facilitate the 
theory choice: since such virtues conflict, even the realist about them must admit that 
some virtues must be pragmatic while others arise from the nature of the objective world, 
but it may be impossible to find out which virtue is an indicator of objective truth. For ‘a 
priori’ metaphysicians, it is difficult to establish that a theory’s conformity with any one 
or more of the theoretical virtues is an indication of that theory’s greater plausibility 
compared to its rivals, nor that it is a sign of objective truth, but for the supporter of 
naturalized metaphysics it is impossible; conforming with theoretical virtues does not 
provide a basis for the naturalist metaphysician to decide which ontological theory is the 
correct one. 
 
The third means by which one might choose between competing theories involves the use 
of philosophical or common-sense intuition. However, although this constraint is popular 
among contemporary metaphysicians, it is immediately problematic in naturalized 
metaphysics. In naturalized metaphysics, the use of intuition cannot simply be an appeal 
to the ‘common-sense’, pretheoretical intuitions of the kind which G E Moore famously 
espoused, and which were enthusiastically taken on board by David Armstrong and 
David Lewis, the problem being that it is not clear how or whether such a faculty is 
supposed to be understood if the methodology of metaphysics is continuous with that of 
science. Scientific researchers distrust what we might take to be everyday common-sense 
claims about middle-sized objects and our understanding of concepts, and question 
whether a consistent and coherent body of such intuitive knowledge exists at all.22 
Moreover, for the empirical researcher, the denial of ‘common-sense’ claims is not in any 
way problematic if experimental evidence supports such a denial, thus the rejection of a 
theory as being ‘counter-intuitive’ would not be justified. For the supporters of 
naturalized metaphysics, such empirically-grounded hostility arising from both scientific 
practice and research findings makes the troubles for the use of intuition more serious 
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than for those who do not subscribe to the naturalized conception. Furthermore, for some 
champions of naturalized metaphysics (for example, Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1.2), the 
use of intuition is diagnosed as being the source of myriad problems in metaphysics, 
which their metaphysical methodology is intended to solve: intuition is regarded as 
nothing more than unfettered armchair speculation, and, as such, is an anathema to 
science. 
 
In the face of such hostility, it may seem that there is obviously no place for intuition in 
naturalized metaphysics; but such a verdict might be too quick. It may be possible, for 
instance, to provide a naturalistically acceptable account of intuition in order to 
countenance its use in metaphysical theory choice. For such an account to work, it would 
be necessary to say why the use of intuition is epistemically reliable, and to do so from a 
broadly empiricist perspective. Furthermore, in the current context of ontological theory 
choice, such a putative naturalistic account of intuition must be broad enough to apply to 
intuitions about ontology and, more specifically, if possible, the ontology of the natural 
world, without begging the question about the nature of that ontology. To do this is a tall 
order, as I am about to explain, and I think that these restrictions are such that the 
supporter of naturalized metaphysics has good reason to be pessimistic that such a project 
will ever be successful. To attempt to establish this point, I will briefly consider some of 
the putative naturalistic accounts of intuition available.23  
 
Broadly speaking, the role of intuitions in philosophical methodology is two-fold: the 
first is to discover the range of possibilities available for the definition or analysis of a 
concept, or formulation of a philosophical system; and the second involves the 
justification of one account, definition or set of necessary and sufficient conditions over 
others. For those looking for a naturalistic account, the second justificatory role is the 
harder to explain in the light of empirical evidence, whereas the former process of 
discovery of philosophical options by means of reflection is more apt to be explicable in 
a way which is in keeping with the methodology of natural science. After all, within 
empirical science there is the need to generate novel hypotheses or conceptual 
connections, and such as-yet-untested principles are frequently the products of processes 
which are rather epistemically suspect (via hunches, daydreams, dreams and lucky 
guesses, for instance, including Kekulé’s famous account of his conceptualizing the 
benzene ring), so the use of such reflection in metaphysics is should not trouble the 
naturalistic metaphysician unduly. In scientific investigation, however, these candidate 
hypotheses and concepts are falsified or confirmed by experimental investigation—thus 
removing the need for the justificatory role of intuitions—but it is unclear whether such 
empirical investigation could provide the requisite justification for a particular 
metaphysical theory over others (a matter I will consider further below).  
 
Hilary Kornblith (2002; 2007) suggests a naturalized account of intuition which embraces 
this role of discovery, casting certain concepts as natural kinds and thus treating 
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conceptual analysis, or investigation of intuitions about a concept, as being analogous to 
the collection of natural kind samples in sciences such as geology or biology. (Also see 
Ahlstrom 2009 for another application of intuition in epistemology.) Intuitive 
investigations are intended, on this view, to demarcate the extension of a concept and the 
manifestations that its instantiations may take, by means of non-empirical reasoning. 
However, for this understanding of intuition to be useful, one must be able to regard to 
the concepts under investigation as natural kinds (or suitably analogous to them, if that is 
different). Kornblith is specifically concerned with intuitions about the concept of 
knowledge, which he argues is a natural kind, and in cases (such as the Gettier cases) 
which form the basis of intuitive judgments about whether a someone has knowledge or 
not. Examination of such cases can determine what does, and does not, count as 
knowledge; and, as in the case of the kinds in some natural sciences, there need be no 
particular demand for exactness in such assessments. However, even if Kornblith has 
given a plausible naturalistic account of the applicability of intuitive judgments in 
epistemology about whether cases belong to the category of being knowledge, his 
account does not seem to extend to the justification of one account of knowledge over 
another, nor to the existence of knowledge at all. Therein lies the primary problem with 
the applicability of this account of intuition to the comparative justification of ontological 
theories under discussion. Although something like Kornblith’s account of discovery has 
already been brought to bear in the generation of the different, competing ontological 
theories in Section 3, the realist naturalistic metaphysician is interested in which 
categories of entities and processes actually exist in the natural world, and this evaluation 
would require intuitive judgments to be used in their justificatory role, not simply to 
decide questions of about the category membership of entities or which theories or 
metaphysical systems one might adopt. Moreover, the use of ontological categories such 
as that of natural kinds in the course of Kornblith’s account presents another serious 
difficulty for the application of his naturalistic account of intuitions to ontological 
theories, since it requires a significant ontological category to be explicated in the first 
place. The range of ontological theories on offer do not all countenance the existence of 
entities like natural kinds as Kornblith understands them, and it would be question-
begging to require their existence (even pre-theoretically). Thus, it seems that Kornblith’s 
account cannot be utilized in the case of ontological questions. 
 
Alvin Goldman also tries to rehabilitate intuitions for the naturalist, with limited success 
(Goldman 1998; Goldman 2007). Although the naturalist commonly worries that 
intuitions are fallible, that their reliability cannot be determined, and that they conflict 
from person to person, he argues that this does not prevent the consultation of intuitive 
judgments in certain cases. For example, he maintains that the difficulties noted above do 
not preclude the use of intuition for the investigation of personal, psychological concepts: 
intuitions can tell us about our own mental entities or concepts, and perhaps the relations 
between them. Epistemic warrant in such cases arises from, or is supervenient upon the 
psychological processes that are causally responsible for belief. Furthermore, Goldman 
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suggests that some shared, interpersonal concepts might be susceptible to such treatment 
in addition to the intrapersonal ones. However, although this account may help naturalize 
some applications of intuition, giving epistemic warrant to intuitive reasoning methods 
and conceptual judgments which might be important in the study of the mind, 
consciousness and cognition, it does not lend itself to making intuitive judgments about 
the nature of the objectively-existing, mind-independent natural world. Intuition gives 
access to mental entities (some of which are perhaps shared with other people), not the 
extra-mental world in which the naturalistic metaphysician is interested.  
 
In addition to the two options just discussed from Kornblith and Goldman, some 
naturalists might suggest that we can use some form of reflective equilibrium to accept 
and amend theories in a similar manner to the way in which Nelson Goodman suggests 
that rules of deductive and inductive inference (and other strictly ‘unprovable’ principles) 
can be adopted (Goodman 1955, Chapter III, Section 2).24 For example, we can choose 
an intuitively satisfactory ontological theory, adopt it for the purposes of philosophical 
reasoning, and then amend that theory if it turns out to have counter-intuitive 
consequences for empirical investigation, or else it conflicts with general principles 
which we take to be more important. The revised theory can then be treated in the same 
manner and adjusted as required. However, there are two problems with the adoption of 
this reflective equilibrium approach to intuitions about inference or ontology. First, the 
empirical evidence suggests that which rules of inference and theories we find intuitively 
compelling are often fallacious, and that human reasoning and reflection does not pick up 
on this fact; reflective equilibrium does not seem to work very well. As Stephen Stich 
points out, ‘reflective equilibrium is not a reliable, rational, coherent method of belief 
formation’ (Stich 1988). The second problem with reflective equilibrium lies with its not 
being conducive to robust realism: the theory which we happen to accept, which works, 
which fits with our concepts and does not run up against other difficulties when faced 
with exposure to empirical and philosophical practice is not guaranteed, or even likely, to 
be the one which is objectively true of the natural world. There seems to be no point at 
which a theory chosen in this manner puts us in better epistemic contact with the 
ontology of the natural world than any of the rejected candidate theories do; there seems 
to be no reason why intuition would happen to begin with knowledge about the objective 
nature of the world, or else why this systematized reflection should result in such 
knowledge. If it works at all in ontological theory choice, reflective equilibrium supports 
a form of pragmatism or internal realism about the ontology of our best theory: we are at 
liberty to treat the entities of our theories as being real (whatever that means), but we 
have no warrant to assert that such entities constitute the natural world.25  
 
These examples do not give much cause for optimism that it will be possible to marshal 
intuitive judgments and reasoning to the rescue in order to maintain a version of robust 
realism in naturalized metaphysics; that is, in order to choose which ontological theory is 
the correct one. Although intuition may find roughly the same kind of role in both science 
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and metaphysics, its utility arises much earlier, in the formative stages of theoretical 
development or hypothesis formation when the range of potential candidates is being 
developed and improved, rather than at the point where the correct theory is being 
selected. Of course, since the examples I have considered are only a sample from the 
literature on intuition, there may yet be a successful proposal for a naturalistic account of 
intuition which can act as a basis for theory choice, but the persisting difficulty for 
naturalist realists is that, given the empirical findings about intuition, how could our 
intuitions tell us about the nature of the natural world? There may yet be reasons to 
overcome this pessimistic outlook, but I have yet to find an account of naturalized 
intuitive judgments that is up to the job. 
 
The fourth and final option for choosing between competing ontological theories is the 
scientistic claim that science will ultimately answer our ontological questions about the 
objective world. There are two aspects to this strategy: first, one might constrain the 
content of our metaphysical theories by developing them in such a way that metaphysics 
is ‘driven by’ science, or motivated by the aim of unifying previously problematic areas 
of scientific discourse; second, one might rely upon scientific investigation to tell us 
which categories the world contains. There is much to be said in response to these 
suggestions, but I will minimize my remarks, having discussed them in some detail 
elsewhere.26 On the first point, it is not clear how restricting metaphysics to sorting out, 
or unifying, difficulties within current scientific theories would help to reduce or to 
remedy the problem of ontological plurality. Such a move might work, if one could 
support an additional assumption that there is only one correct theory of the world, and 
that theory is at least suggested by (or being converged upon) by the disparate theories of 
our current science. However, such an assumption both begs the question that one’s 
favoured ontological background to current science is the one privileged by the natural 
world (rather than the world being best described by another ontological theory), and 
goes against the spirit of naturalized metaphysics. Furthermore, on the second point, 
epistemic access to the objectively existing ontology of the world does not appear to be a 
likely product of scientific endeavour. Committed naturalist realists admit that science 
should be able to tell us which metaphysical categories there are, especially if our 
naturalized metaphysical theories are derived from or inspired by science. However, there 
is yet to be any good reason to believe that this claim is true, as Ladyman admits 
(Ladyman 2007). Scientific enquiry is adept at predicting and explaining, but it does so 
from within a theoretical framework, already presupposing some basic ontological 
categories and largely oblivious to alternative metaphysical accounts which would also 
ground the science just as well. Science has yet to answer any metaphysical questions, 
and it is not clear why one should believe that it will do so in the future (other than out of 
optimistic faith in the naturalistic realist endeavour).  
 
On the basis of this survey of the four options, I am led to the pessimistic conclusion that 
Premise (3) is most probably true and the supporter of naturalized metaphysics has no 
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way in which to choose which of the candidate ontological theories is the best one, or the 
one true of the natural world. While this is the weakest of all the premises, since I have 
not shown that there is no such way; however, I can currently offer no further viable 
suggestions for how one might make such a choice, even though a method may exist. 
Having attempted to establish premises (1)-(4), it is now time to draw conclusions from 
the incompatibility of naturalized metaphysics with a commitment to robust realism 
about the entities in metaphysical theories. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Naturalized metaphysics lacks the methodological resources to make a choice between 
alternative ontological theories, and thereby fails to satisfy a requirement of realism. 
From this, as I noted previously, one can draw two, alternative conclusions, which are not 
mutually exclusive: either the naturalist about metaphysics must compromise on his 
methodology; or, a retreat from robust realism is required.  
 
The first conclusion involves admitting that the methodology permitted by naturalized 
metaphysics is inadequate if one wishes to maintain realism, and allowing use of some 
extra methodological ammunition to deal with the problem of theory choice, even when 
such methodology goes against the tenets of scientific enquiry. Metaphysics, on this view, 
might be closely allied with science, but not methodologically continuous with it: one 
might still require that such methodology, and the metaphysics which results from its use, 
does not openly conflict with science, for example. Perhaps one way to achieve this aim 
would be to permit substantive a priori reasoning about ontology—that is, to permit 
metaphysical theorizing and conceptual analysis over and above that which would be 
employed in empirical theorizing—on condition that the resulting theories do not conflict 
with science, or restrict which of our current scientific hypotheses could turn out to be 
true. This extra resource would aim to constrain metaphysical theorizing to the physically 
possible (to the extent that this can be determined),27 and sideline those theories that are 
physically impossible, however intuitively compelling they may be.28 Thus, the close 
relationship between science and metaphysics to which the naturalistic metaphysicians 
aspired would be partially maintained. 
 
The second route one might take in light of the conflict between naturalized metaphysics 
and robust realism is to find fault with the latter. One might, for instance, decide to reject 
the robust realist’s claim that the ontology of our theories provides an accurate inventory 
and structure of the objectively-existing entities of the natural world in favour of a view 
which permits greater epistemic slack between theoretical ontology (or terminology) and 
the world. There would be a choice of options about how much reality one might wish to 
accord theoretical entities: one might favour an internal realism which treated the entities 
of our best current ontology as ‘real’, but that would run the risk of descending into 
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ontological relativity given the on-going disagreement about which ontological theory is 
best. Or, one might embrace ontological relativity, or some variety of instrumentalism or 
pragmatism, stepping back from the question of which entities to count as real and which 
not. Such views open the way to choosing ontological theories in the light of scientific 
considerations, or on the basis of methods which aim for reflective equilibrium between 
empirical and non-empirical considerations.  
 
There is one final point to consider before finishing this discussion, and that concerns the 
extent to which one can distinguish between ontological options, such as those discussed 
in Premise (1) within the context of naturalized metaphysics. If there is (most probably) 
no way in which to choose between these ontological options for the naturalistic 
metaphysician, perhaps one might argue that there is no difference, despite the prima 
facie differences between them. The initial inclination of most metaphysicians would be 
to object that this could not be the case: the alternative theories contain different 
categories of entities and processes, or combine in different ways. They treat different 
entities as fundamental and as derived, thus distinguishing themselves from each other, 
and cannot be run together in the way which I am suggesting. But it is not clear whether 
these objections are well-founded when it comes to the naturalist’s streamlined armoury 
of methods. In ‘a priori’ metaphysics, the ontological alternatives are clearly different 
theories: an ontology in which properties are entirely determined by causal or nomic 
relations is very different from one in which nomic relations are entirely determined by 
an ontology of properties.  
 
However, it is not clear that one can make sense of such notions of fundamental and 
derivative entities within naturalized metaphysics, leaving it open to question whether 
there is any difference between these theories at all. Although such terms as 
‘fundamental’, ‘derived’, ‘eliminated’ and the like are frequently employed in 
metaphysical discourse, they are rarely defined nor the scope of their application set out. 
(Indeed, it is often merely assumed that the reader knows what is meant by them; for 
example by Ainsworth 2010, 56.) In fairness to those who use them, it is reasonably 
intuitively clear what the first and third terms mean: fundamental entities or processes are 
just that, the most basic or primitive which exist from whence the rest arise somehow; 
and eliminated entities are those which do not exist (usually those which we commonly 
presume do exist, or else their non-existence would not be worthy of note). But one might 
mean one of several things by calling a category of entities ‘derived’, although in the case 
of entities or processes the term cannot retain its original meaning of logical derivation. 
So I will venture some tentative definitions here. 
 
Entities of category A exist as derived entities in a schema S if and only if: 
 
(i) the constitutive identity and individuation criteria of elements of A are 
wholly determined by entities of categories which are members of S; 
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(ii) entities of category A exist in virtue of the existence of entities of 
categories which are members of S; 
(iii) entities of category A are constituted by entities of categories which 
are members of S; 
(iv) entities of category A are supervenient on entities of categories which 
are members of S; 
(v) entities of category A are realised by entities of categories which are 
members of S. 
 
For naturalist metaphysicians there might also be a further option such that:  
(vi) Entities of category A exist as derived entities in a schema S if and only if at least one 
of (i) – (v) hold, except that the intrinsic natures of entities of category A are not entirely 
determined by categories which are members of S, however whatever extra something 
exists is functionally or explanatorily irrelevant to the workings of the overall system S. 
 
I will not pause to evaluate each of these definitions in detail here29, since the pursuit of a 
priori metaphysics is not the current topic of this paper, but what seems clear is that 
whichever conception of what it is to be a derived entity is adopted, the naturalist 
metaphysician will at a loss to decide whether a category of entities is derived, rather than 
being fundamental to a realist ontological account of the natural world. Derived entities 
simply appear in the ontology alongside fundamental ones, and the order of ontological 
priority is not something which is on empirical show. It seems plausible to suppose that 
such information is simply not empirically available, nor does it creep by some other 
means into our scientific theories such that we can unambiguously determine which 
metaphysical categories of entities are fundamental and which derived. 
 
Furthermore, the difficulties with spelling out the notion of derivative entities 
complicates ontological accounts which claim to eliminate entities from the ontology, 
especially for naturalistic metaphysicians: one can eliminate entities simpliciter by 
rejecting the existence of a category of entities which is ontologically independent from 
other categories in the system, but it is not clear that one can eliminate a category of 
entities which is derivable in the system. Derivative entities turn up for free given the 
existence of those entities which ground them, just as certain sentences are entailed by 
others whether we like it or not. Of course, one can refuse to call a category of entities by 
their common name: for instance, trope theorists need not call the bundles of tropes 
related by compresence ‘objects’ rather than ‘bundles of tropes’, but their theory then 
only bears a terminological difference from someone who does call those derived 
individual bundles ‘objects’. Of course, if one is prepared to go against the spirit of 
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naturalistic metaphysics, one can declare such derivative categories eliminated (simply 
because one needs no names for them); but, even when pursuing metaphysics as an a 
priori autonomous discipline, this eliminativism is tendentious in comparison to that 
which dispenses with an ontologically independent category of entities. The implication 
of not being able to explicate ontological priority in naturalized metaphysics would result 
in the ontological alternatives discussed in Section 3 being only terminologically 
different. If this is the case, then what should the supporter of naturalized metaphysics do 
now? 
 
One strategy, in such circumstances, would be to embrace a form of structuralism about 
metaphysical theories, similar to the earlier versions of structuralism in the philosophy of 
mathematics, or science, and to embrace the conclusion that is not necessary to make a 
choice between competing ontological theories: either because of our epistemic 
limitations we are unable to make such a choice, or because there is no such choice to be 
made. The former conception of structuralism, which one might call ‘Weak’ or 
‘Epistemic Metaphysical Structuralism’ would treat the failure of naturalized metaphysics 
to distinguish between alternative ontological theories as an epistemic problem; one or 
another of the ontological theories we have might be true of the objective world, but we 
cannot tell which one that is. On the other hand, the latter conception, which could be 
called ‘Strong’ or ‘Ontic Metaphysical Structuralism’ would diagnose the failure to detect 
a difference between theories as being evidence for the fact that there is no objective 
difference between ontological theories, the structure is all that there is. This strong 
version of structuralism opens the door once more to robust realism in naturalized 
metaphysics, albeit in a new and intriguing way, since Premise (4) of the argument which 
asserts that the realist metaphysician must make a decision between competing 
ontological theories (which has hitherto been uncontested) no longer holds. One could be 
a realist about the shared ontological structure—whatever that is—of all the explanatorily 
equivalent ontological theories, maintaining that this structure is or represents the 
ontological structure of the objective natural world. 
 
One or other of these conceptions of metaphysical structuralism may be useful in 
naturalized metaphysics, resolving as it does the arguments between alternative 
ontological views which seemed insoluble in Section 4. Furthermore, its adoption might 
be in keeping with the other commitments to structuralism in science which finds much 
favour with some supporters of naturalized metaphysics. As such, I propose that the 
tenability of this view of ontology is worthy of further exploration, while being mindful 
that philosophical caution is required: a view which seems initially plausible might lead 
to a metaphysical dead end.    
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1Metaphysics is sometimes described as the study of ontology and causation. I do not disagree with this 
definition, however I take causation—whatever that is—to be included in the ontology, most usually as a 
process of some kind. 
2‘Natural world’ is meant in a very broad sense here. For example, it could include the entire Everettian 
multi-verse, were one of the Many Worlds interpretations the most favoured in quantum theory, or else it 
could allow for the existence of spatiotemporal regions distinct from the one we inhabit were our 
cosmology to countenance multiple Big Bangs. It is difficult for naturalists to justify either of these options 
in physical theory, but this need not be of concern here.  
3The label ‘autonomous’ is used by Ladyman (2007, 181) and the conception of metaphysics broadly 
supported by Ladyman and Ross 2007, especially Ch. 1; Esfeld 2004; Esfeld 2009; Maudlin 2007 among 
others. The reason for the scare quotes in ‘‘a priori’’ metaphysics’ will be explained below.  
4Thus, as Chakravartty (manuscript) has noted, the ontological accounts proposed by certain well-known 
supporters of naturalized metaphysics frequently do not satisfy their own restrictions on a priori speculation 
nor maintain the requisite proximity to empirical enquiry.  
5For example, Ladyman and Ross state ‘the raison d’être of a useful metaphysics is to show how the 
separately developed and justified pieces of science (at a given time) can be fitted together to compose a 
unified worldview’ (2007, 45) and stress ‘the need for an ontology apt for contemporary physics, and a way 
of dissolving some of the metaphysical conundrums it presents’ (2007, 131).  
6Adherents to this robust realism about the entities of our scientific theories include metaphysical realists, 
such as Armstrong 1978;  Devitt 1984; Devitt 1999; Devitt 2005; Devit 2010; those who maintain that most 
of our scientific predicates genuinely refer, including Boyd 1984, 41-2; Fales 1988, 253-4; Jennings 1989, 
240; Matheson 1989; Papineau 1979, 126; those who maintain science justifies belief in the mind-
independent existence of the entities in our theories including Kukla 1998, 10; Psillos 1999, xix-xxi. In 
addition, some of the more ardent realist supporters of naturalized metaphysics propose an essentially 
structural ontology, such as that found in versions of Ontic Structural Realism. See Ladyman 1998 and 
passim; Ladyman and Ross 2007; Ainsworth 2010; Esfeld 2004; Esfeld 2009;  Esfeld and Lam 2008; 
French 2006; French 2009; French and Ladyman 2003; Redhead 1999; Saunders 2003.  
7The ontology required to ground qualitative similarity may not be entirely mind-independent, but I will 
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presume here that it is, since my primary interest is in the fortunes of realist ontological theories when they 
are combined with naturalism. However, even according to these realist theories of qualitative similarity, is 
not required that all such apparent cases of similarity have an objective basis, merely that some of them do.  
8Not all of these philosophers subscribe to naturalized metaphysics, and so some are personally immune to 
the complaints raised in the current paper. Their ontological views are compatible with naturalized 
metaphysics, however, and may be adopted in conjunction with it.  
9The former are associated with Plato, the latter Armstrong (passim). For simplicity, I will leave aside the 
issue about whether blue, or any of my other examples would actually be genuine objectively-existing mind 
independent universals.    
10The distinction between these will be discussed in greater detail below. 
11Although traditional ‘a priori’ metaphysical views can avoid the problem of ontological choice which, I 
argue, afflicts naturalized metaphysics, I have argued elsewhere that these metaphysical theories face a 
further sceptical challenge when they are conjoined with realism about classification within ontological 
categories; that is, which properties, or which tropes, or which universals (and so on) exist (see Allen 2002). 
The naturalized metaphysician faces sceptical problem with both ontological categories and classification 
within these categories. 
12This would be true on any of the property theories suitable to account of qualitative similarity and 
difference, since such entities must be essentially general or repeatable, whether or not they also possess 
individual natures or quiddities.  
13Although one could conceive of the causal efficacy of a property being manifested by its individual 
qualitative nature (or the individual qualitative nature of each of its instances) in this way, such a view is 
open to the objection that it is not clear whether one would also be able to account for the causal generality 
evident over different instances of the same property. Thus, it appears that each property instance would be 
required to have contrasting qualitative aspects—or even an internal structure—to account for both causal 
individuality and causal generality, a conception which goes against the conception of individual qualities 
offered thus far. Bearing this problem in mind, the preferred ontology for those who support singularist 
conceptions of causality is more likely to be one of concrete particulars such as Davidsonian events 
(Davidson 1969; Davidson 1985), thereby permitting different (although perhaps not strictly individuable) 
qualitative aspects to be manifested by the same particular.  
14There are other versions of ontic structural realism which do not include their eliminativism about 
ontological categories other than relations (including Esfeld 2004; Esfeld 2009; Ainsworth 2010), indeed 
Ladyman and Ross sometimes seem to equivocate about this point. Contrast: ‘There are no things. 
Structure is all there is.’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 130) with an immediate softening of this view which 
permits objects as long as they are not self-subsistent individuals (2007, 131); that is, objects exist 
derivatively, as they do in many other ontological theories such as some forms of trope theory, for example. 
As will become clear, however, supporters of naturalized metaphysics are not in a position to make much of 
these subtle ontological differences. 
15I do not wish to imply here that such haecceity is required by any account of objects, merely to suggest 
that should it be thought desirable, the ontological theories in which objects are derivative would be able to 
account for the appearances of such a feature.  
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16The term ‘mind-independent’, although conventional, is slightly confusing since minds might be part of 
the natural world if physicalism is correct. Furthermore, they could (arguably) exist mind-independently in 
the sense that the existence of a mind does not require a mind to conceive it as such. Nothing in this 
discussion is meant to preclude minds being physical or otherwise part of the natural objective world. 
17Realist proponents of naturalized metaphysics might run up against the problems raised in Dummett 1978 
were they to consider such logical revisions, but I shall not discuss the matter further here. 
18There are very different characterisations of mathematics and mathematical knowledge supported by 
those who embrace a largely empiricist, naturalistically inclined, account of the nature of the natural world, 
which I cannot consider in detail here. However, such disagreements rarely, if ever, impinge upon the 
mathematical practice of scientists and mathematicians. 
19This is not the sole reason for their lack of popularity. However, there are ongoing attempts to provide 
relativistic versions of collapse theories (see Tumulka 2006a; Tumulka 2006b). 
20Lewis (1983, 218-227, especially 226), for instance, makes the assumption that our understanding of the 
natural world corresponds to the objective nature of reality. I have argued elsewhere (Allen 2002) that 
Lewis’s presupposition is poorly justified, but I will not pursue this point here as such a move would clearly 
be excluded within naturalized metaphysics.  
21A notable example of the discovery of unwanted complexity in scientific investigation occurred with the 
discovery of the second and third families of fundamental particles, starting with the muon in 1936 (to 
which Isidor Rabi famously responded ‘Who ordered that?’). 
22Well known evidence from cognitive psychology counts against at least two aspects of the use of intuition 
in philosophical theorizing: the formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition of a 
concept, and the use of intuitive rules of inference. In the former case, the psychological demarcation of 
concepts has been found to be less exact or well-delineated than philosophers would traditionally aim for, 
as well as being socially determined in a way which is problematic for philosophy’s general ‘universal’ 
claims. (See, for example, Rips 1975; Rosch 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Smith and Medin 1981.) In 
research concerning the latter, human subjects  have been shown to find all sorts of fallacious reasoning 
patterns to be intuitively acceptable, and to continue to do so after reflection, thereby undermining the 
notion that reasoning or reflective equilibrium, can provide a rational and coherent methodology for belief 
formation. (See Nisbett and Ross 1980; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982).  
23There have been important attempts to rehabilitate intuition in the face of the empirical charges against it, 
but these are not in keeping with the naturalistic methodology required by the conception of metaphysics 
under discussion. See Bealer 1996, against which see Feltz 2008. In particular, Bealer treats metaphysics as 
being autonomous and able to have authority over science.  
24Goodman does not use the term ‘reflective equilibrium’; the name appears in Rawls 1971.  
25It is worth noting that Goodman was not attempting to sustain realism with his suggestion, rather to 
explain the pragmatic way in which our entrenched rules and concepts can be refined. Moreover, by his 
later career he had decided that worrying about what was real and what was not made no sense. (Goodman 
1978, especially Ch. VI) 
26See Allen, unpublished for further discussion concerning the relationship between science and 
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metaphysics in naturalized metaphysics. Also, see Allen 2002. All the counterarguments to the scientific 
realists’ strategies to find out which natural properties objectively exist also apply to attempts to discover 
which ontological categories there are.  
27I have previously suggested this constraint before within the context of an argument that many ‘a priori’ 
metaphysical theories give ontological accounts of the natural world which contradict current science, in 
the sense that they pre-determine the truth values of current hypotheses (usually rendering them false). See 
Allen, 2007. I will not consider here whether theories of naturalized metaphysics also fail in this regard.  
28It is important to note here that hypotheses which are not physically possible from our current epistemic 
perspective would not be entirely ruled out on this view, for fear of prejudging later empirical and 
theoretical developments. 
29It is likely that this list is not exhaustive and also that some of the options run together on further 
examination. Furthermore, although I could imagine them being presented as serious suggestions for 
characterizing derived entities (and they intuitively do that), it would go outside the scope of this paper to 
investigate fully whether or not they work.  
